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1 Introduction
Functional cryptography is emerging in the last years as a very interesting
and powerful paradigm: decryptions or signatures can be now computed by
several users, as long as they have enough rights, instead of by a unique user in
possession of a secret key, as it is the case in the classical setting of public key
cryptography. This more general setting of functional encryption seems much
more suitable for real-life applications involving large amounts of different
kinds of data, users and operations, such as storage and computation in the
Cloud, big data analysis, social networks, or the Internet of Things.
Attribute-based cryptography is perhaps the particular case of functional
encryption which has found more applications and, thus, has received more
attention from the cryptographic community. In a typical attribute-based cryp-
tosystem, the secret operation (signing or decrypting) can be performed only
by users who hold a subset of attributes that satisfy some policy. Attribute-
based cryptosystems must satisfy a collusion-resistance property: if a set of
users, each of them holding attributes that do not satisfy the given policy,
collude and try to perform the secret operation, they must fail to do so, even
if the union of all their attributes satisfy the policy. This is the usual setting
in attribute-based signature schemes [26,28,15,4,22] and in ciphertext-policy
attribute-based encryption [7,24,25]. For encryption, the dual version of key-
policy attribute-based encryption has also been defined and widely studied
[20,29,9]: here the users’ secret keys are related to policies, and ciphertexts
are related to subsets of attributes; the ciphertext can be decrypted by a se-
cret key only if the subset of attributes in the ciphertext is authorized for the
policy in the secret key. Although the notion of ciphertext-policy may seem
a bit more realistic, it turns out that key-policy attribute-based encryption
has found some interesting applications, for instance in the area of verifiable
delegation of computation [30].
The collusion-resistance property required to attribute-based cryptosys-
tems makes it quite difficult to design secure systems. To do so, researchers
have taken profit from the additional algebraic properties provided by math-
ematical objects like bilinear/multilinear maps or lattices. As a result, most
of the attribute-based cryptosystems proposed up to now make use of lat-
tices or multilinear maps; this includes very general constructions admitting
arbitrary circuits as policies [18,19,8]. The only exceptions can be found in
the area of attribute-based signatures, with [22] based on RSA, and some
generic constructions [26,4] that could in principle be implemented with RSA,
as well. However, it is still desirable to study if attribute-based cryptogra-
phy can be based on other classical techniques and security assumptions, like
those in the traditional (pairing-free) Discrete Logarithm setting. The interest
is both theoretical, to understand if more complex tools like pairings or lattices
are necessary for building some cryptographic functionalities, and practical,
because cryptosystems in the traditional Discrete Logarithm setting can be
implemented in elliptic curves where elements in a group may have a shorter
representation, which may lead to clear efficiency gains. We note that there
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exist (at least) two recent examples where the same problem of building cryp-
tographic protocols in the Discrete Logarithm pairing-free setting has been
considered, in scenarios quite close to that of attribute-based cryptography. In
[2], for the problem of anonymous credentials systems, which is very related
to attribute-based signatures; and in [1], for the problem of inner-product
encryption, which is another particular case of functional encryption.
1.1 Our Contributions
We propose in this work the first (to the best of our knowledge) attribute-
based cryptosystems which use techniques and security assumptions of the
pairing-free Discrete Logarithm setting. For attribute-based signatures, the
new scheme is proved secure (private and unforgeable) in the random oracle
model, under the only assumption that the Discrete Logarithm problem is hard
to solve. For attribute-based encryption, we design both a ciphertext-policy
scheme and a key-policy scheme. The security of both schemes is proved in
the standard model, under the assumption that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman
problem is hard. With these security properties in mind, and also due to the
similarities in their designs, it is natural to consider the new schemes as the
attribute-based versions of classical cryptosystems like Schnorr signatures [33]
or ElGamal encryption [14].
A positive property of the schemes is that they achieve adaptive security,
meaning that the schemes are secure even in front of adversaries that choose
the challenge input (messages, policy and subset of attributes) in the challenge
phase. This is in contrast to selective security, where the considered adversaries
choose the challenge input in the setup phase of the systems. A negative prop-
erty of the new schemes is the fact that they are bounded : a bound L on the
maximum number of secret keys generated by the system must be chosen in
the setup phase. Once the system has generated L keys, the setup phase must
be run again, to generate new public parameters. Furthermore, the efficiency
of the schemes (for instance the size of the public parameters, signatures and
ciphertexts, and the computational cost of the protocols) depends on this
bound L. This may be a serious limitation for possible uses of the schemes in
some real-life applications, like social networks, with a huge expected number
of users. Therefore, a direct implementation of the new schemes could make
sense only in quite closed applications, for instance in small companies or
institutions.
As we explain in the next Section 1.2, it seems hard to avoid this limi-
tation when designing attribute-based cryptosystems in the pairing-free Dis-
crete Logarithm setting. Interestingly, the bounded-security property may be
enough in some applications of attribute-based cryptography. Indeed, a generic
tranformation from a key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme to a pro-
tocol for the publicly verifiable delegation of computation is given in [30],
where the security level required for the attribute-based primitive is one-key
security. Actually, authors of [30] mention as an open problem the design of
4 Javier Herranz
one-key secure attribute-based cryptosystems with more efficiency or simplic-
ity than the existing ones (which achieve unbounded security). Our results can
be seen as an answer to this problem, because we show that nor pairings or
lattices are needed in order to get one-key security. Combining our key-policy
attribute-based encryption scheme with the construction in [30], one immedi-
ately obtains a protocol for the publicly verifiable delegation of computation
of boolean functions, which does not require pairings or lattices, and whose
adaptive security is based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption.
1.2 Why to Bound the Number of Users?
In the attribute-based cryptosystems that we propose in this work, both the
number (and name) of possible attributes and the number of users of the Sys-
tem must be bounded in advance. The first assumption is quite realistic and
common in the attribute-based literature, since the possible attributes in real-
life applications are usually known in advance, and not so many. However,
imposing a bound on the number of users is a very strong limitation, which
restricts the possible application of the proposed schemes to particular situa-
tions with few expected users, for instance providing attribute-based features
to a small company or institution.
The question at this point is: can we avoid this drawback (bounding the
number of users) in an attribute-based cryptosystem which does not use pair-
ings, where the parameters are polynomial on the number of attributes, and
where security relies only on the Discrete Logarithm family of assumptions
(including the Discrete Logarithm and Computational / Decisional Diffie-
Hellman ones)? We give now some informal arguments which seem to indicate
that the answer to the previous question is ‘No’. This will not be a formal
(impossibility) result at all. In particular, our arguments are based on the
current state-of-the-art in the area of digital signatures. Therefore, giving a
final and formal answer to the previous question remains as an interesting and
challenging open problem.
First of all, let us stress that we want to keep the parameters of the scheme
polynomial on the (fixed) number N of attributes of the systems. If this is not
a requirement, then it is quite easy to design attribute-based cryptosystems
with the desired properties: if P˜ denotes the global set of attributes, let us just
generate one pair of ElGamal / Schnorr keys (ski, pki) for each subset Ai ⊂ P˜.
The set of public keys will form the public parameters of the attribute-based
system. When a user requests a secret key for a subset of attributes S ⊂ P˜,
he receives the secret keys ski for all subsets Si ⊂ S. Note that the size of
both the public parameters and secret keys are exponential on N . Later, for
instance in the case of encryption, to encrypt a message for a decryption policy,
one takes all the minimally authorized subsets {B1, . . . , Bk} for that policy (a
basis), and encrypts the plaintext for all the public keys associated to these
sets (using multiple encryption techniques to re-use the randomness). If a user
is authorized, some subset Si in his secret key will match some of the subsets
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Bj in the basis of the decryption policy, and so he could use the corresponding
secret key ski to decrypt and obtain the plaintext. A similar solution for the
case of (Schnorr) signatures is straightforward. It is easy to prove the selective
security of the resulting cryptosystems.
Taking apart these solutions with exponential dependence on the number
of attributes, the best we can do is to include, in the public parameters, some
elements for each of the attributes in P˜ = {at1, . . . , atN}. Since we want to
work in the (pairing-free) Discrete Logarithm scenario, where we have a public
group G = 〈g〉 with prime order q, we can assume that we have some elements
from G in the public parameters, whereas the master secret key contains the
discrete logarithms (element in Zq) of those values. So let us assume that the
public parameters contain {(gxi,1 , . . . , gxi,k}ati∈P˜ , for some value k (polyno-
mial in N), whereas the master secret key contains the corresponding discrete
logarithms {(xi,1, . . . , xi,k}ati∈P˜ . When a user requests a secret key for a subset
of attributes S ⊂ P˜, he should get some secret, sensitive, unforgeable informa-
tion related to the values {(xi,1, . . . , xi,k}ati∈S . Typically, as it happens in the
identity-based setting, the values contained in the secret key can be thought
as digital signatures computed by the master entity on the corresponding at-
tributes; in the attribute-based setting, moreover, all the “signatures” must be
linked, in order to prevent collusion attacks. We can distinguish three possi-
bilities depending on the type of elements included in the resulting secret key
skS :
(i) skS contains only elements from G. In this case, even the verification of the
validity of skS must involve the use of pairings, to check that the elements
in skS and some elements from the public parameters satisfy some Diffie-
Hellman relation. The same will happen later, in the signature/verification
or encryption/decryption protocols. Actually, all the current pairing-based
attribute-based cryptosystems belong to this category (i).
(ii) skS contains elements from Zq, and the verification of the validity of skS
does involve the evaluation of some hash function. An example of this sit-
uation would be a system where each user can have at most one attribute
ati, and the secret key for that user would be a Schnorr signature (hi, si)
of message ati, satisfying hi = H(g
si · y−hi , ati), where y is part of the
master public key. In the more realistic case where users may have more
attributes, all the Schnorr signatures should be linked and randomized to
prevent collusion attacks. This would lead to the appearance of (at least)
one element R in the secret key skS , specific and different for each user,
which furthermore must be added as an input of the hash evaluations, to
preserve unforgeability of the secret keys. All in all, it seems impossible,
for instance in the case of attribute-based signatures, that a user can later
prove possession of some attributes without revealing some information on
R or values hi. This means that the resulting attribute-based signatures
would be linkable, and so, the privacy requirement for attribute-based sig-
natures would not be achieved. Note that this strategy is essentially the
one proposed in [2] for an anonymous credential system based on DDH:
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the credentials can be used at most once, because a second use of the same
credentials would break anonymity. After the first use of the credentials,
the user must go to the master entity to obtain new credentials.
Something similar happens in the case of encryption: if we do not want
to rely on pairings, then it seems that the values R should be taken into
account by the sender of the message when encrypting the plaintext, in
order to allow later decryption. But this means that the sender must know
in advance the identities of the users that will decrypt, and that those
values R should be included in the public parameters. Both things are
unrealistic.
(iii) skS contains elements from Zq, and the verification of the validity of skS
does not involve the evaluation of any hash function. Taking into account
that secret keys skS must be unforgeable, it seems we are now in the same
situation as if we would like to design a secure digital signature scheme
based on the Discrete Logarithm Assumption which does not use hash
functions or pairings. The best that can be done in this situation, according
to the current state-of-the-art, is to bound in advance (before defining the
public key) the total number of messages that could be signed; otherwise, if
the number of signatures available to an adversary is unlimited, he can infer
enough equations between the signatures and the (unknown) elements of
the secret key so that he gets the whole secret key and breaks the security
of the system. In the digital signature setting, bounding the number of
signatures led to the concept of k-times signature (with particular interest
in the case k = 1) [32,6,27]. Translating this concept to our attribute-
based setting, what we will get is a situation where the number of secret
key queries is bounded. If we assume that the system can control that each
user makes at most one secret key query, then what we get is a situation
where the number of users participating in the system must be bounded
in advance.
Summing up, our personal conclusion (after spending some time trying to
design attribute-based cryptosystems in the pairing-free Discrete Logarithm
setting) is a conjecture: in such a setting, and keeping all the parameters
polynomial in N , the best one can do is to have systems where the number of
users is bounded in advance. Once again, we encourage researchers to consider
this problem and try to give a formal answer to the question discussed in this
section.
1.3 Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the
Discrete Logarithm setting, in particular the Discrete Logarithm and Deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman Assumptions, and also we recall the definitions for zero-
knowledge proofs of knowledge, which will be the main building block in the
design of our attribute-based signature scheme.
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Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to (bounded) attribute-based signatures: we
first recall the syntax definition and the required security properties for such
schemes, and then in Section 4 we describe the new scheme and prove its secu-
rity, in the random oracle model, under the Discrete Logarithm Assumption.
Both the design and the security analysis of the scheme are tightly related
to a new zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for a language related to dis-
crete logarithm relations. Section 5 contains the definitions of the protocols
and the required security properties for (bounded) attribute-based encryp-
tion, in its two versions: ciphertext-policy and key-policy. We describe the
new ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme in Section 6, where
we prove its adaptive (but bounded) security in the standard model, under the
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption. Part of the security proof is related to
an algebraic property of a (huge) matrix; the proof of this property, which
involves simple but long linear algebra arguments, is moved to Appendix A
in order to ease the global reading of the paper. Section 7 is the analogue of
Section 6, but now for a new key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme.
For simplicity we describe and analyze our new schemes in the case of
threshold policies; in Section 8 we explain how the schemes can be adapted
in order to admit more general policies. We also discuss some (in)efficiency
aspects of our schemes in that section, and we observe that our key-policy
attribute-based encryption scheme can be combined with the construction in
[30] to get a protocol for the publicly verifiable delegation and computation of
boolean functions.
2 Mathematical Framework and Building-Blocks
The typical Discrete Logarithm framework consists of a cyclic group G of
prime order q. Examples of such groups are subgroups of Zp, for some prime
p, when q|p − 1, or groups of points in an elliptic curve. Given a generator g
of G, and another element y ∈ G, the discrete logarithm of y with respect to
g is the integer x ∈ Zq such that gx = y.
We will assume the existence of some algorithm (q,G, g) ← DLog.Inst(1λ)
which, on input a security parameter λ, outputs a triple (q,G, g), where q is a
prime with λ bits, and G = 〈g〉 is a cyclic group.
Definition 1 (Discrete Logarithm problem.) An algorithm ADLog solves
the Discrete Logarithm problem inG if it receives as input (q,G, g)← DLog.Inst(1λ)
and a randomly chosen y R← G, and outputs x ∈ Zq such that gx = y.
The Discrete Logarithm Assumption states that the probability that any
algorithm ADLog solves the Discrete Logarithm problem in polynomial time is
negligible in λ, meaning that this probability decreases (as λ increases) faster
than the inverse of any polynomial.
Definition 2 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem.) An algorithmADDH
solves the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH, for short) problem in G if it re-
ceives as input (q,G, g) ← DLog.Inst(1λ) and a triple of elements (gx, gy, gz)
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in G, where x, y R← Zq are randomly chosen and z is either random or z =
xymod q, and is able to distinguish which is the case.
A bit more formally, the advantage of an algorithm ADDH in solving the
DDH problem is defined by considering the following experiment, ExpddhADDH (λ),
involving an adversary B.
ExpddhADDH (λ)
Choose b R← {0, 1} at random
(q,G, g)← DLog.Inst(1λ)
Choose x, y R← Zq independently and at random
If b = 0, compute T = gxy; if b = 1, sample T R← G independently and at random
b′ ← ADDH(q,G, g, gx, gy, T )
Output 1 if b′ = b, and 0 otherwise.
The advantage of ADDH in solving the DDH problem is defined as
AdvddhADDH (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpddhADDH (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
The DDH Assumption states that the advantage of any polynomial time
algorithm ADDH in solving the DDH problem is negligible in λ.
2.1 Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge
Let R be a relation, containing pairs (x,w), such that, given (x,w), the fact
(x,w) ∈ R can be verified in polynomial time. We will call x the statement
and w the witness. We define the language LR as the set of statements x for
which there exists a witness w such that (x,w) ∈ R.
A zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPK) for a relationR is a (possibly
interactive) protocol between two parties, a prover P and a verifier V , with
common input x, where the prover convinces the verifier that he knows a
witness w for which (x,w) ∈ R, without revealing any additional information.
Namely, the inputs for the prover are a statement x and a witness w such that
(x,w) ∈ R, whereas the input for the verifier is just x. At the end, the output
for the verifier is 1 if it accepts the proof or 0 if it rejects it.
In this work we deal with a particular kind of ZKPK protocols, known
as Sigma protocols, where the interaction consists of three steps. First of all,
the prover computes and sends a commitment Cmt, then the verifier sends a
challenge c, and finally the prover computes and sends an answer Ans. The
final output of the verifier depends only on R, x,Cmt, c,Ans. The transcript of
an execution of this protocol is denoted as (Cmt, c,Ans).
For simplicity, we recall the security requirements of a ZKPK protocol for
this particular case of Sigma protocols. A ZKPK must satisfy the following
three properties:
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2.1.1 Completeness.
Intuitively, this property ensures that, if the prover behaves honestly, then
everything works fine and a valid proof is always accepted.
Definition 3 A ZKPK for a relation R is complete if, for all (x,w) ∈ R, then
an execution of the protocol where the input of the prover is (x,w) is always
accepted by the verifier.
2.1.2 Knowledge Soundness.
Informally, this property guarantees that a (possibly malicious) prover who
makes a proof be accepted as valid must actually know a witness. Let W (x) =
{w | (x,w) ∈ R} denote the set of valid witnesses for element x.
Definition 4 A ZKPK for a relation R has knowledge soundness if there
exists a polynomial-time extractor E such that, for any prover P˜ and any
statement x, the probability that E, given access to transcripts of the protocol
executed by P˜ , outputs w such that w ∈ W (x), is not significantly less than
the probability that the executions run by P˜ are accepted as valid.
2.1.3 Zero-knowledge.
This property ensures that a valid proof for x does not reveal any information,
other than the fact that there exists a witness w such that (x,w) ∈ R. More
formally,
Definition 5 A ZKPK for a relation R is zero-knowledge if, for any honest
verifier V˜ , there exists a polynomial-time simulator algorithm S such that for
any x ∈ LR, S(R, x, V˜ ) generates a transcript (Cmt, c,Ans) whose distribution
is indistinguishable from the transcript of an execution of the protocol run by
a honest prover, with input (x,w) ∈ R, and verifier V˜ .
This zero-knowledge property implies witness indistinguishability [16], which
states that given a valid execution of the protocol for statement x, it is compu-
tationally hard to distinguish which witness in W (x) was used by the prover.
A stronger notion considers the possibility that verifier V˜ is malicious; how-
ever, since the role of the verifier in our signature scheme will be played by
a hash function which behaves as a random function (and so, honestly), as
sketched in the next paragraph, the zero-knowledge property with respect to
honest verifiers will be enough.
The Fiat-Shamir [17] heuristics can be applied to a Sigma protocol in order
to get a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol, where
the whole elements in the proof are computed by the prover (the transcript
is then usually denoted as pi). The idea is to simply replace the challenge c
computed by the verifier with the result of applying a hash function to the
inputs (x,R,Cmt). In the random oracle model [5], where the hash function
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is assumed to behave as a completely random function, this transformation
preserves the security properties of the initial ZKPK protocol. If a message m
is included as an additional input of the hash function, this technique allows
the construction of signature schemes (known as signatures of knowledge), with
security in the random oracle model. This is exactly what we will do in our
signature scheme: a particular attribute-based signature will be a signature of
knowledge, applied to the corresponding message, for a specific language that
we will describe later.
3 (Bounded) Attribute-Based Signatures: Protocols and Security
In this section we describe the protocols that form an attribute-based signature
scheme, as well as the security properties that must be required to such a
scheme. An attribute-based signature is linked to a determined signing policy
(P, Γ ): a set P of attributes and a (monotone increasing) family Γ ⊂ 2P of
subsets of P. A valid signature means that a signer possessing all the attributes
of some of the subsets in Γ is the author of the signature. The monotonicity
property ensures that S1 ⊂ S2, S1 ∈ Γ ⇒ S2 ∈ Γ . The most common and
simple example of such a monotone increasing family of subsets is the threshold
case: in a (t, n)-threshold signing policy, the set P contains n attributes, and
Γ = {S ⊂ P : |S| ≥ t}. That is, by verifying a threshold attribute-based
signature, the verifier is convinced that the author of the signature holds at
least t of the attributes included in the set P.
3.1 Syntactic Definition
A bounded attribute-based signature scheme consists of four probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms:
– Setup(1λ). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ
and outputs some public parameters pms and a master secret key msk.
The public parameters contain the possible universe of attributes P˜ =
{at1, . . . , atN} and a bound L for the maximum number of users.
– KeyGen(S,msk, pms). The key generation algorithm takes as input the mas-
ter secret key msk, the public parameters pms and then a set of attributes
S ⊂ P˜ satisfied by the user. The output is a secret key skS .
– Sign(m,P, Γ, skS , pms). The signing algorithm takes as input a message m,
a signing policy (P, Γ ) where P ⊂ P˜ and Γ ⊂ 2P , a secret key skS and the
public parameters pms, and outputs a signature σ.
– Verify(σ,m,P, Γ, pms). The verification algorithm takes as input the signa-
ture σ, the message m, the signing policy (P, Γ ) and the public parameters
pms, and outputs 1 (accept) or 0 (reject), depending on the validity of the
signature.
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Of course, the usual property of correctness must be required. Intuitively,
a signature for a signing policy (P, Γ ) that is computed by using skS such that
S ∩ P ∈ Γ must be always accepted by the verification protocol.
3.2 Security Definitions
Privacy.
Intuitively, privacy means that, given a valid signature, nobody (including
the master entity and the stateless user who computed the signature) can
obtain any information about the real author of the signature. In other words,
given two subsets S0 and S1, with S0, S1 ⊂ P∗, and a valid signature σ ←
Sign(m,P, Γ, skSb , pms) for a signing policy Γ such that S0, S1 ∈ Γ , nobody
can guess the bit b with probability significantly bigger than 1/2. The privacy
property is formally defined via the following experiment ExpprivB (λ), involving
an adversary B.
Expprivb,B(λ)
Choose b R← {0, 1} at random
(pms,msk)← Setup(1λ)
(m,P, Γ, S0, skS0 , S1, skS1 , st1)← B(pms,msk)
Verify that skSi is a valid secret key for Si, for i = 0, 1
Verify that S0 ∩ P ∈ Γ and S1 ∩ P ∈ Γ
σ∗ ← Sign(m,P, Γ, skSb , pms)
b′ ← B(σ∗, pms,msk, st1)
Output 1 if b′ = b, and 0 otherwise.
The advantage of B in breaking the privacy property is defined as
AdvprivB (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpprivB (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 6 An attribute-based signature scheme is private if, for any ad-
versary B that runs in polynomial time, the advantage AdvprivB (λ) is negligible
in the security parameter λ.
Since the adversary B can obtain the master secret key (and so, secret
keys for all identities of his choice), it is easy to see that the privacy property,
as defined above, implies other properties like signer’s anonymity and non-
linkability of different signatures.
Unforgeability.
An attribute-based signature scheme must satisfy the property of existential
unforgeability against chosen message and signing policy attacks. Such prop-
erty is defined by the following experiment ExpunfF (λ) involving an adversary
F .
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ExpunfF (λ)
(pms,msk)← Setup(1λ)
(σ∗,m∗,P∗, Γ ∗)← FKeyGen(·,msk,pms), Sign(·,pms)(pms)
Output 1 if all the following statements are true:
(i) Verify(σ∗,m∗,P∗, Γ ∗, pms) returns 1;
(ii) F has not made any secret key query S such that S ∩ P∗ ∈ Γ ∗;
(iii) the number of secret key queries is at most L (the bound given in pms);
(iv) (m∗,P∗, Γ ∗, σ∗) is not the result of any signature query from F .
Otherwise, output 0
The advantage of F in breaking the unforgeability of the scheme is defined
as AdvunfF (λ) = Pr[Exp
unf
F (λ) = 1]. We stress that F is allowed to make up
to L adaptive queries for secret keys of subsets S of his choice, and adaptive
signing queries for tuples (m,P, Γ ) of his choice, where Γ ⊂ 2P . The last kind
of queries are answered by choosing a random subset S ⊂ P with S ∈ Γ , and
then by running skS ← KeyGen(S,msk, pms) and σ ← Sign(m,P, Γ, skS , pms).
Definition 7 An attribute-based signature scheme is unforgeable if, for any
adversary F that runs in polynomial time, the advantage AdvunfF (λ) is negligible
in the security parameter λ.
The above definition of unforgeability guarantees collusion resistance: a
group of colluding users that pull their secret keys together will not be able
to sign messages for a signing policy that none of the attribute sets of these
users satisfies. The definition is in the adaptive setting where the attacker
chooses the target signing policy (P∗, Γ ∗) after making some queries. This is
in contrast to the weaker selective setting where the attacker must choose the
target signing policy at the very beginning of the attack.
4 The New Attribute-Based Signature Scheme (for Threshold
Signing Policies)
In this section, we describe our attribute-based signature scheme. For simplic-
ity, we consider the case of threshold signing policies. Therefore, a pair (P, Γ )
will be represented as (P, t), where 1 ≤ t ≤ |P|. Later, we will explain how
the scheme can be modified to support other (more general) signing policies.
4.1 The Proof of Knowledge
The language of the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that will be used in the
proposed attribute-based signature scheme is related to the public information
x =
(
q,G, g, h, {Yi,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤M ,P, t
)
, where The setup algorithm starts by
running (q,G, g) ← DLog.Inst(1λ), which outputs a cyclic group G = 〈g〉 is a
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cyclig croup of prime order q, elements h, {Yi,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤M all belong to G,
and (P, t) is a signing policy.
A witness w for the fact that x belongs to this language consists of
(
a, S′, {si}ati∈S′
)
,
where a = (a1, . . . , aM ) ∈ (Zq)M , S′ ⊂ P is a subset with |S′| = t attributes
and, for all ati ∈ S′, it holds that si ∈ Zq − {0} and gsi =
M∏
j=1
Y
aj
i,j . Without
loss of generality, let us assume P = {at1, . . . , atn} and S′ = {at1, . . . , att}.
An interactive zero-knowledge Sigma protocol (three steps) where the prover
proves the knowledge of a witness for such a statement can be constructed by
combining existing techniques (see for instance [12,13,10]), as described below.
We first provide the intuition of the protocol, and then we detail the steps of
the protocol, in both its interactive and non-interactive versions.
4.1.1 A High-Level Description.
For simplicity, let us consider the case where the signing policy is simply
({ati∗}, 1), that is, there is only one attribute and the threshold is 1. Therefore,
the proof of knowledge consists in proving knowledge of a = (a1, . . . , aM ) ∈
(Zq)M and si∗ such that:
(i) gsi∗ =
M∏
j=1
Y
aj
i∗,j , and
(ii) si∗ ∈ Zq − {0}
This simple case can be solved by combining (via an “and” proof) the
protocol in [10] to prove knowledge of relations between the exponents of
public values, for the item (i), and the protocol in [12] to prove knowledge of
an element s−1i∗ such that (g
si∗)s
−1
i∗ = 1, for the item (ii).
However, the language that we consider here is more complex in general,
because the signing policy can contain a set P with n ≥ 1 attributes, the
threshold can be any value t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and the protocol must prove
knowledge of at least t values si ∈ Zq − {0}, where ati ∈ S′ and S′ ⊂ P is a
subset with |S′| = t attributes. The solution to go from the simpler case with
a single attribute to this more complex case is to employ the techniques in
[13]: therein, authors describe a method to transform a zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge ZKPK1 for a single element in a certain language into a zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge ZKPK(t,n) for a (t, n)-relation in that language:
the second protocol proves knowledge of at least t witnesses for the belonging
of t elements to the language, out of n public elements. The basic idea is
to simulate executions of ZKPK1 for n − t instances for which the witness
is unknown (thanks to the zero-knowledge property of ZKPK1), to run real
executions of ZKPK1 for the t instances for which the witness is known, and
to tie the n executions and the challenge with a polynomial with degree at
most n− t; the polynomial is sent to the verifier, as well. The final verification
step simply takes the n executions, checks their validity and checks that all of
them are consistent with the polynomial.
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This idea can be extended to the case of more general relations (or policies),
not only threshold ones, by using the idea of dual access structures. The details
can be found in [13].
4.1.2 The Interactive Version.
1. The prover generates the first message (commitment) of the Sigma protocol
as follows:
– For j = 1, . . . ,M and for i = 1, . . . , n, choose ri, κi, δj
R← Zq, and
compute Ai = h
ri ·
M∏
j=1
Y
aj
i,j and Ti = h
κi ·
M∏
j=1
Y
δj
i,j .
– For i = t + 1, . . . , n, choose ci, ui, u˜i, zi, z˜i
R← Zq, and for each i =
t + 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . ,M , choose wi,j
R← Zq. Compute the values
Ui = A
−ci
i · gui · hzi , A˜i = Au˜ii · h−z˜i · g−ci , Ri = A−cii · hzi ·
M∏
j=1
Y
wi,j
i,j .
– For i = 1, . . . , t, choose αi, βi, α˜i, β˜i
R← Zq, and for each i = 1, . . . , t and
j = 1, . . . ,M , choose δi,j
R← Zq. Compute the values Ui = gαi · hβi ,
A˜i = A
α˜i
i · h−β˜i , Ri = hβi ·
M∏
j=1
Y
δi,j
i,j .
The commitment sent by the prover is
Cmt =
({(
Ai, A˜i, Ti, Ri, Ui
)}
1≤i≤n
)
.
2. The verifier chooses c R← Zq and sends the challenge c back to the prover.
3. Finally, the prover performs the following computations:
– Find the (only) polynomial f(x) ∈ Zq[X] with degree at most n − t
such that f(0) = cmod q and f(i) = ci mod q for all i = t+ 1, . . . , n.
– For i = 1, . . . , t, compute ci = f(i) mod q and then compute the values
ui = αi + cisi mod q, u˜i = α˜i + cis
−1
i mod q, zi = βi + ciri mod q and
z˜i = β˜i + ciris
−1
i mod q.
– For i = 1, . . . , t and for j = 1, . . . ,M , compute wi,j = δi,j + ciaj mod q.
– For all i = 1, . . . , n, compute the values ei = κi + cri mod q. For all
j = 1, . . . ,M , compute the values wj = δj + caj mod q.
The final answer sent by the prover is
Ans =
(
f(x), {(ui, u˜i, zi, z˜i, ei, {wi,j}1≤j≤M )}1≤i≤n , {wj}1≤j≤M
)
.
In order to validate the correctness of the proof, the verifier outputs 1 if
and only if the degree of f(x) is at most n−t and f(0) = c and all the following
equalities hold for all i = 1, . . . , n, where ci = f(i) mod q:
(1) Ti = A
−c
i · hei ·
M∏
j=1
Y
wj
i,j .
(2) Ri = A
−ci
i · hzi ·
M∏
j=1
Y
wi,j
i,j .
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(3) Ui = A
−ci
i · gui · hzi .
(4) A˜i = A
u˜i
i · h−z˜i · g−ci .
4.1.3 The Non-Interactive Version.
We can apply the Fiat-Shamir heuristics to this Sigma protocol, by replacing
the value c R← Zq chosen by the verifier with the output of a hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq when computed by taking as inputs all the public values
of the language and statement, x, and also the values in Cmt. If we include
as an additional input a message m to be signed, the resulting answer Ans is
a signature of knowledge, on m, that proves that the author of the message
knows a witness for the corresponding statement.
In this particular case, the signature on m would be
σ =
(
f(x), {(Ai, ui, u˜i, zi, z˜i, ei, {wi,j}1≤j≤M )}1≤i≤n , {wj}1≤j≤M
)
.
To verify the validity of such a signature for a message m and threshold policy
(P, t), one checks that the degree of f(x) is at most n − t, defines ci = f(i)
for i = 1, . . . , n, computes the values Ti, Ri, Ui, A˜i by following equations
(1), . . . , (4) above, and finally checks if
f(0) = H
(
m,x,
{(
Ai, A˜i, Ti, Ri, Ui
)}
1≤i≤n
)
.
4.2 Security of the Proof of Knowledge
Let us prove that the interactive proof of knowledge that we have described
in Section 4.1.2 achieves the necessary security level. Correctness of the zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge is very easy to validate.
Regarding the zero-knowledge property, let us describe a suitable simulator
S which works for any statement x in the language, and for any (possibly
dishonest) verifier V˜ . Recall that the goal of S is to produce a transcript
(Cmt, c,Ans) whose distribution is indistinguishable from the transcript of an
execution of the protocol run by a honest prover, with input (x,w) ∈ R, and
verifier V˜ . The simulator S acts as follows:
1. Choose c R← Zq with the same distribution as V˜ does.
2. Choose at random a polynomial f(x) ∈ Zq[X] with degree at most n − t
such that f(0) = cmod q. Define ci = f(i) mod q for all i = 1, . . . , n.
3. For all i = 1, . . . , n, choose at random Ai, A˜i
R← G and ui, zi, u˜i, z˜i, ei R← Zq.
For all j = 1, . . . ,M , choose at random wj
R← Zq. Finally, for all i = 1, . . . , n
and all j = 1, . . . ,M , choose at random wi,j
R← Zq.
4. For all i = 1, . . . , n, compute the values Ti = A
−c
i · hei ·
M∏
j=1
Y
wj
i,j , Ri =
A−cii · hzi ·
M∏
j=1
Y
wi,j
i,j , Ui = A
−ci
i · gui · hzi , A˜i = Au˜ii · h−z˜i · g−ci .
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5. Define the commitment as Cmt =
({(
Ai, A˜i, Ti, Ri, Ui
)}
1≤i≤n
)
, and the
final answer as
Ans =
(
f(x), {(ui, u˜i, zi, z˜i, ei, {wi,j}1≤j≤M )}1≤i≤n , {wj}1≤j≤M
)
.
6. Output the transcript (Cmt, c,Ans).
It is easy to see that the distribution of this transcript is exactly the same
as the distribution of a transcript generated by a honest prover P who knows
a witness for x, and V˜ .
Finally, let us show that the proposed zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
achieves the knowledge soundness property, assuming the hardness of the Dis-
crete Logarithm problem.
Theorem 1 Assuming the Discrete Logarithm problem is hard in G, then the
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge proposed in Section 4.1 achieves knowledge
soundness.
Proof Let us denote the success probability of P˜ as . The extractor E plays
the role of the verifier and runs the zero-knowledge protocol with P˜ twice, in
parallel, but for the same first message coming from P˜ . As the second message
of the protocol, E chooses two random but different challenges c, c′ R← Zq, with
c 6= c′. With probability 2, the two answers from P˜ to these two challenges are
successful. If this is the case, E knows two accepted transcripts (Cmt, c,Ans)
and (Cmt, c′,Ans′). Let us denote them as
Cmt =
({(
Ai, A˜i, Ti, Ri, Ui
)}
1≤i≤n
)
Ans =
(
f(x), {(ui, u˜i, zi, z˜i, ei, {wi,j}1≤j≤M )}1≤i≤n , {wj}1≤j≤M
)
Ans′ =
(
f ′(x),
{(
u′i, u˜
′
i, z
′
i, z˜
′
i, e
′
i, {w′i,j}1≤j≤M
)}
1≤i≤n , {w′j}1≤j≤M
)
.
Since the two transcripts are valid, we have f(0) = c 6= c′ = f ′(0). The
two polynomials have degree at most n − t, so we conclude that there must
be at least t indices i such that ci = f(i) 6= f ′(i) = c′i (otherwise, the two
polynomials would be equal in more than n− t points and would therefore be
the same polynomial, which contradicts the fact f(0) 6= f ′(0)). Without loss
of generality, let us assume that ci 6= c′i for i = 1, . . . , t.
The two answers satisfy equations (1), . . . , (4) in Section 4.1. Dividing the
two valid instances of equation (1) for each index i = 1, . . . , n, we have that
Ac−c
′
i = h
ei−e′i ·
M∏
j=1
Y
wj−w′j
i,j holds for all i = 1, . . . , n. Let us denote ri =
ei−e′i
c−c′ mod q and aj =
wj−w′j
c−c′ mod q, for all j = 1, . . . ,M , and thus we have
Ai = h
ri ·
M∏
j=1
Y
aj
i,j (Eq.1i)
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Dividing the two valid instances of equation (2) for each index i = 1, . . . , t,
we have that A
ci−c′i
i = h
zi−z′i ·
M∏
j=1
Y
wi,j−w′i,j
i,j holds for all i = 1, . . . , t. Denoting
rˆi =
zi−z′i
ci−c′i mod q and ai,j =
wi,j−w′i,j
ci−c′i mod q, for all j = 1, . . . ,M we have
Ai = h
rˆi ·
M∏
j=1
Y
ai,j
i,j (Eq.2i)
Now looking at equalities (Eq.1i) and (Eq.2i), for each index i = 1, . . . , t, we
have two representations of Ai with respect to the basis h, Yi,1, . . . , Yi,M . Using
a well-known result [11], under the assumption that the Discrete Logarithm
problem is hard in G, it turns out that the two representations must be the
same. Therefore, we have rˆi = ri for all i = 1, . . . , t, and we have ai,j = aj for
all i = 1, . . . , t and all j = 1, . . . ,M .
If we divide now the two valid instances of equation (3) for each index
i = 1, . . . , t, we have that A
ci−c′i
i = g
ui−u′i · hzi−z′i holds for all i = 1, . . . , t.
Denoting si =
ui−u′i
ci−c′i mod q, we have
Ai = g
si · hrˆi (Eq.3i)
Combining equalities (Eq.2i) and (Eq.3i), and using the fact that ri = rˆi
for each index i = 1, . . . , t and ai,j = aj for all i = 1, . . . , t and all j = 1, . . . ,M ,
we conclude that
gsi =
M∏
j=1
Y
aj
i,j ,
for all i = 1, . . . , t, as desired. Now we have to show that these values si are
different from zero.
If we divide the two valid instances of equation (4) for each index i =
1, . . . , t, we have that gci−c
′
i = Au˜i−u˜
′
i · hz˜′i−z˜i holds for all i = 1, . . . , t. Let
us note that u˜i − u˜′i 6= 0 under the assumption that Discrete Logarithm prob-
lem is hard in G; otherwise, from the previous equality one gets the discrete
logarithm of h with respect to the basis g. Denoting s˜i =
u˜i−u˜′i
ci−c′i mod q and
r˜i =
z˜′i−z˜i
ci−c′i mod q, we have s˜i 6= 0 mod q and
g = As˜ii · hr˜i (Eq.4i)
Combining equalities (Eq.3i) and (Eq.4i), for each index i = 1, . . . , t, we
get g1−sis˜i = hr˜i+s˜iri . Under the assumption that the Discrete Logarithm is
hard in G, again, the only possibility is 1− sis˜i = 0 mod q, which in particular
means that s˜i = s
−1
i mod q and thus si 6= 0 mod q, for each i = 1, . . . , t, as
desired. uunionsq
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4.3 Description of the Signature Scheme
Setup(1λ). The setup algorithm starts by running (q,G, g) ← DLog.Inst(1λ),
which outputs a cyclic group G = 〈g〉 of prime order q, such that q is λ bits
long. A cryptographic hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq is chosen. The global
set of attributes P˜ = {at1, . . . , atN} is chosen. A bound L for the maximum
number of users in the system is given. Finally, the value M = L+N is defined.
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and all j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, choose xi,j R← Z∗q indepen-
dently and at random, and compute Yi,j = g
xi,j . An additional element h R← G
is also randomly chosen.
The public parameters of the system are pms = (q,G, g, h,H, P˜, L,N, {Yi,j}1≤i≤N,1≤j≤M ),
whereas the master secret key is msk = {xi,j}1≤i≤N,1≤j≤M .
KeyGen(S,msk, pms). The key generation algorithm takes as input a subset
of attributes S ⊂ P˜, the master secret key msk and the public parameters pms.
The master entity chooses at random a vector a = (a1, . . . , aM )
R← (Zq)M
and, for each ati ∈ S, computes the value si =
M∑
j=1
ajxi,j mod q. If some of the
elements si is equal to zero (which happens with negligible probability), the
master entity chooses a new vector a.
The global secret key is skS = (a, {si}ati∈S). In total, skS contains M + |S|
elements from Zq.
The receiver of the secret key can validate its correctness by checking that
gsi =
M∏
j=1
Y
aj
i,j , for all ati ∈ S.
Sign(m,P, t, skid,S , pms). The signing algorithm takes as input a message
m, a set of attributes P ⊂ P˜, a threshold t, a secret key skS = (a, {si}ati∈S)
and the public parameters pms. The algorithm selects a minimally authorized
set S′, this is, a subset of S ∩ P of cardinality exactly t. Without loss of
generality and to simplify notation, let us assume P = {at1, . . . , atn} and
S′ = {at1, . . . , att}. To generate the signature, the user runs the non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol described in Section 4.1, with m as
an additional input of the hash function (signature of knowledge), to compute
PK
(a, S′, {si}ati∈S′) s.t. S′ ⊂ P ∧ |S′| = t ∧ ∀ati ∈ S′ : (si 6= 0 ∧ gsi =
M∏
j=1
Y
aj
i,j
) (m)
The resulting signature (following the notation in Section 4.1) is
σ =
(
f(x), {(Ai, ui, u˜i, zi, z˜i, ei, {wi,j}1≤j≤M )}1≤i≤n , {wj}1≤j≤M
)
.
Verify(σ,m,P, t, pms). The verification algorithm takes as input a message
m, the signature σ on m, the threshold signing policy (P, t), with n = |P|,
and the public parameters pms. It simply checks the validity of the proof of
knowledge. That is:
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1. Verify that the degree of f(x) is at most n− t.
2. For all ati ∈ P, compute ci = f(i) and the values Ti = A−ci · hei ·
M∏
j=1
Y
wj
i,j ,
Ri = A
−ci
i · hzi ·
M∏
j=1
Y
wi,j
i,j , Ui = A
−ci
i · gui · hzi , A˜i = Au˜ii · h−z˜i · g−ci .
3. Return 1 if f(0) = H
(
m,x,
{(
Ai, A˜i, Ti, Ri, Ui
)}
ati∈P
)
, and return 0
otherwise. Here we are denoting x =
(
g, h, {Yi,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤M ,P, t
)
.
Remark 1 If some vector a given to some user as part of his secret key was
a linear combination of other vectors a(`) given to other users, then the secu-
rity of the scheme could be compromised, since the system could not resist a
collusion attack. The probability of such a linear dependence is negligible in
the security parameter λ. However, in a real implementation of this scheme,
it could be desirable to explicitly check that such dependence relations do not
occur. This can be done by the master entity, for instance, by choosing the L
vectors a(1), . . . ,a(L), linearly independent in (Zq)M , during the Setup proto-
col, and then assigning vector a(`) to the `-th secret key query (in a stateful
process). See also Section 4.6 for a different and more efficient generation of
the L vectors a(1), . . . ,a(L).
4.4 Privacy of the Signature Scheme
This property is achieved, in the random oracle model, because two valid sig-
natures computed with two different secret keys for the same signing policy are
actually two valid proofs of knowledge for the same statement, but computed
with different witnesses. We have proved that the interactive proof of knowl-
edge protocol underlying our attribute-based signature scheme achieves the
(honest-verifier) zero-knowledge property in a perfect way. This implies [16]
the perfect witness indistinguishability of that proof of knowledge, against hon-
est verifiers. When the interactive protocol is turned into a signature scheme
via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, the witness indistinguishability property is pre-
served, in the random oracle model for the hash function H.
4.5 Unforgeability of the Signature Scheme
Theorem 2 Assuming that the Discrete Logarithm problem is hard in G, then
the proposed attribute-based signature scheme satisfies the unforgeability prop-
erty. The proof is in the random oracle model for H.
Proof We are going to prove that, if there exists some adversary F which
breaks the unforgeability property of the scheme with probability ε, then we
20 Javier Herranz
can solve the Discrete Logarithm problem with probability ≈ ε2
q2H
, where qH is
the number of queries that F makes to the random oracle.
Let (q,G, g, y) be the instance of the Discrete Logarithm problem that we
want to solve. We start running the experiment ExpunfF (λ) with adversary F ,
by choosing the public parameters of the scheme. To do so, we choose the
global set of attributes P˜ = {at1, . . . , atN} and the bound L for the maximum
number of users in the system (and so, for the number of extraction queries
that F can make). We define the value M = L + N . We choose τ R← Z∗q and
define h = yτ .
To define the values {Yi,j}1≤i≤N,1≤j≤M , we chooseN vectors θi = (θi,1, . . . , θi,M ) R←
(Zq)M , for i = 1, . . . , N , randomly, in general position. With overwhelm-
ing probability, these N vectors will be linearly independent (we repeat the
random choice if this is not the case). We choose N other vectors µi =
(µi,1, . . . , µi,M )
R← (Zq)M , for i = 1, . . . , N , also randomly. For each i =
1, . . . , N and each j = 1, . . . ,M , we define Yi,j = g
µi,j · yθi,j .
The public parameters of the system that we give to F are pms = (q,G, g, h,H,
P˜, L,N, {Yi,j}1≤i≤N,1≤j≤M ), where the description of H is simply “random
oracle”. Therefore, we maintain a table TABH where we introduce and store
the input-ouput relations of this oracle. Each time F makes a hash query, we
check if the input is already in TABH ; if this is the case, we answer with the
corresponding output; if the input is new, we choose an output randomly in
Zq, we answer with this output, and we introduce a new entry in TABH , with
this new input-output relation.
During the experiment, F will make up to L extraction queries, to obtain
secret keys for subsets S of his choice, where S ⊂ P˜, and also will make signing
queries for messages m and (threshold) signing policies (P, t). We have to give
correct answers to all such queries. To answer the `-th extraction query, where
` ∈ {1, . . . , L}, corresponding to some subset of attributes S(`), we choose
a(`) = (a
(`)
1 , . . . , a
(`)
M )
R← (Zq)M at random such that a(`) · θi = 0 mod q, for
all ati ∈ S(`), and such that a(`) is linearly independent with a(1), . . . ,a(`−1).
For each ati ∈ S(`), we compute si =
M∑
j=1
a
(`)
j µi,j . It is easy to check that the
resulting secret key skS(`) = (a
(`), {si}ati∈S(`)) is valid.
Since M = L + N and N is an upper bound for the number of attributes
in such a subset S, it is always possible to find such L linearly independent
vectors a(1), . . . ,a(L), and the secret keys obtained by F in these queries follow
the same distribution as in the description of the scheme.
Regarding the signing queries for m and (P, t), we can answer them by
following essentially the same procedure as the simulator S in the proof of
the zero-knowledge property of the proposed proof of knowledge (in Section
4.2). The only difference is that, once the transcript (Cmt, c,Ans) has been
generated, we have to add the relation H(m,x,Cmt) = c to the hash table
TABH (only with negligible probability this input for H had been queried
before, as a hash query, by F ; we abort the experiment if this is the case).
Here, x denotes the statement of the language, which contains the public
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parameters and also the signing policy (P, t). The signature sent back to F is
σ = Ans.
With non-negligible probability ε, this forger F outputs a valid and non-
trivial signature (σ,m,P, t), where P ⊂ P˜ contains n attributes, 1 ≤ t ≤ n
and
σ =
(
f(x), {(Ai, ui, u˜i, zi, z˜i, ei, {wi,j}1≤j≤M )}1≤i≤n , {wj}1≤j≤M
)
satisfying in particular c = f(0) = H(query), where query =
(
m,x,
{(
Ai, A˜i, Ti, Ri, Ui
)}
1≤i≤n
)
and the values Ti, Ri, Ui, A˜i are computed with equations (1), . . . , (4) in Sec-
tion 4.1.
Now the idea is to use the replay technique, also known as forking lemma
[31]: the experiment ExpunfF (λ) is run again, with the same adversary F and
using the same randomness and the same random oracle answers, until the
query H(query) corresponding to the first forged signature is made. At this
time, a different value c′ R← Zq′ , c′ 6= c is chosen and returned as the answer
to this hash query, and the experiment goes on. With some (non-negligible)
probability ≈ ε
q2H
, the forger F will produce another valid and non-trivial
forgery (σ′,m′,P ′, t′), where
σ′ =
(
f ′(x),
{(
A′i, u
′
i, u˜
′
i, z
′
i, z˜
′
i, v
′
i, e
′
i, {w′i,j}1≤j≤M
)}
1≤i≤n , {w′j}1≤j≤M
)
and c′ = f ′(0) = H(query′), satisfying query′ = query. This means that P ′ = P,
t′ = t, m′ = m, A′i = Ai, A˜
′
i = A˜i, T
′
i = Ti, R
′
i = Ri and U
′
i = Ui. On the
other hand, since f(0) = c 6= c′ = f ′(0) and the two polynomials have degree
at most n− t, where n = |P|, there must be a subset I ⊂ P with |I| ≥ t such
that f(i) = ci 6= c′i = f ′(i), for all ati ∈ I (otherwise, the two polynomials
would be the same one).
From this point, the analysis is exactly the same as in the proof of Theorem
1. From the two forgeries we can extract a vector a = (a1, . . . , aM ) ∈ (Zq)M
and values {si}ati∈I , where si ∈ Z∗q , such that
gsi =
M∏
j=1
Y
aj
i,j , ∀ati ∈ I. (Eq.6)
According to the relation between vector a and vectors {a(`)}1≤`≤L that
we gave to F in the queried secret keys, we can distinguish two cases.
Case 1: a is linearly independent to {a(`)}1≤`≤L.
Let us take an attribute ati ∈ I. Note that the corresponding vector θi =
(θi,1, . . . , θi,M ) ∈ (Zq)M is perfectly hidden in the public values Yi,j = gµi,j ·
yθi,j , for j = 1, . . . ,M . The only information that the attacker F could have
obtained from θi is derived from the extraction queries. Assuming that ati ∈
S(`) for all the extraction queries, what F knows is that θi · a(`) = 0, for all
` = 1, . . . , L. But in this Case 1, we know that a is linearly independent to
{a(`)}1≤`≤L. Let us denote this subspace of (Zq)M as G =
〈{a(`)}1≤`≤L〉. We
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have dimG = L and dim(Ker{θi}) = M − 1 > L, and also we are assuming
G ⊂ Ker{θi}. The probability (over the random choices we have taken during
the reduction) that a ∈ Ker{θi} once we know that a /∈ G is 1/q. This can
be seen, for instance, by extending the basis {a(1), . . . ,a(L)} of G to a basis of
Ker{θi}) (by adding M − 1− L vectors) and finally extending this basis to a
basis of the whole space (Zq)M by adding a last vector. The expression of a
with respect to this basis will have some element different to 0 in the last N
positions, since a /∈ G; the rest of coefficients are randomly distributed. The
probability that a ∈ Ker{θi} is the probability that the last coefficient in the
above-mentioned representation of a is equal to 0, which is 1/q.
Therefore, with overwhelming probability we have a /∈ Ker{θi} in this case.
From the equality (Eq.6) applied to this attribute ati, we infer g
si = gµi·a·yθi·a,
with θi · a 6= 0 mod q. Therefore, we conclude that x = si−µi·aθi·a mod q satisfies
gx = y and thus we solve the given instance of the Discrete Logarithm problem.
Case 2: a is a linear combination of vectors in {a(`)}1≤`≤L.
Let us write a =
∑
1≤`≤L
ψ`a
(`) and let us take some `∗ ∈ {1, . . . , L} such
that ψ`∗ 6= 0 mod q. Going back to the `∗-th extraction query, for a subset
of attributes S(`
∗), by definition of a successful forgery, we know that the
number of attributes in S(`
∗) ∩P is less than t. Therefore, there exists at least
an attribute ati ∈ I −S(`∗). Let us now define the subset of extraction queries
J1 = {` ∈ {1, . . . , L} s.t. ati ∈ S(`)}, and its complement J2 = {1, . . . , L}−J1.
We know that `∗ ∈ J2 and that a(`) · θi = 0 mod q, for all ` ∈ J1. Let us write
and denote
a =
(∑
`∈J1
ψ`a
(`)
)
+
(∑
`∈J2
ψ`a
(`)
)
= aJ1 + aJ2 ,
where aJ1 ·θi = 0 mod q and aJ2 = ψ`∗a(`
∗)+
∑
`∈J2, 6`=`∗
ψ`a
(`). Now a ∈ Ker{θi}
if and only if aJ2 ∈ Ker{θi}. Furthermore, since all the vectors a(`) are linearly
independent, we know that aJ2 /∈ G =
〈{a(`)}`∈J1〉. Therefore, we are in the
same situation as in Case 1, and we conclude that the probability that aJ2 ∈
Ker{θi} is negligible in λ. We thus have a · θi 6= 0 mod q with overwhelming
probability, and we can use the same last step as in Case 1 to find the solution
of the given instance of the Discrete Logarithm problem. uunionsq
4.6 A Variation with Better Efficiency
In the proposed scheme, we could use Vandermonde vectors a = (1, a, a2, . . . , aM−1),
for some value a R← Z∗q , for the vectors that are included in the secret keys
skS . The vectors will be linearly independent as long as all the values a
R← Z∗q
are different, which happens with overwhelming probability in the security pa-
rameter. With this modification, since now the value a is enough to represent
the whole vector a, the size of each secret key becomes |skS | = 1 + |S|, which
is the usual size in the attribute-based literature.
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Furthermore, the efficiency of the signature / verification protocols (and
the size of the signatures) can be improved in this case, because now the kind
of statements in the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge protocol have the form
gsi =
∏
1≤j≤M
Y a
j−1
i,j = g
fi(a), where fi(Z) = xi,1 + xi,2Z + . . . + xi,MZ
M−1 is
the degree M − 1 polynomial defined by the master secret values associated
to attribute ati. The linear dependence on M in the efficiency of our zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge protocol can be reduced to
√
M or even log(M),
by using the techniques in [21,3] for the polynomial evaluation part of the
resulting zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
The unforgeability proof has to be slightly modified, and in particular a
loss factor of 1NL appears in the reduction, since we have to guess, before
preparing the public parameters, the indices `∗ and i that appear in Case 2 of
the proof of Theorem 2.
5 (Bounded) Attribute-Based Encryption: Protocols and Security
Let us move to attribute-based encryption, in both its ciphertext-policy and
key-policy flavours. Through the rest of the paper, we will use CP-ABE and
KP-ABE as abbreviations of ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption and
key-policy attribute-based encryption.
5.1 CP-ABE: Syntactic Definition
A bounded ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) scheme
consists of four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms:
– Setup(1λ). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and
outputs some public parameters pms and a master secret key msk. The pub-
lic parameters contain the possible universe of attributes P˜ = {at1, . . . , atn}
and a bound L for the maximum number of users.
– KeyGen(S,msk, pms). The key generation algorithm takes as input the mas-
ter secret key msk, the public parameters pms and then a set of attributes
S ⊂ P˜ satisfied by the user. The output is a private key skS .
– Encrypt(m,P, Γ, pms). The encryption algorithm takes as input a message
m, a decryption policy (P, Γ ) where P ⊂ P˜ and Γ ⊂ 2P , and the public
parameters pms, and outputs a ciphertext C.
– Decryption(C,P, Γ, skS , pms). The decryption algorithm takes as input a
ciphertext C, a decryption policy (P, Γ ), a secret key skS and the public
parameters pms, and outputs a message m˜.
The usual property of correctness requires that the decryption algorithm,
when run on a ciphertext C honestly computed for plaintext m and policy
(P, Γ ), using secret key skS , must output m if and only if S ∩ P ∈ Γ .
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5.2 CP-ABE: Security Definition
Intuitively, any polinomial-time adversary must have negligible success prob-
ability in distinguishing an encryption of m(0) from an encryption of m(1),
for the same decryption policy (P, Γ ), where the two different plaintexts and
the policy are chosen by the adversary. This must hold even if the adver-
sary has adaptive access to an oracle that answers valid secret keys for sets
of attributes of his choice, provided none of these subsets is authorized for
(P, Γ ). This property, usually denoted as IND-CPA, is formally defined via
the following experiment Expind-cpaACP (λ),involving an adversary ACP .
Expind-cpaACP (λ)
Choose b R← {0, 1} at random
(pms,msk)← Setup(1λ)
(m(0),m(1),P, Γ, st1)← AKeyGen(·,msk,pms)CP (pms)
C∗ ← Encrypt(m(b),P, Γ, pms)
b′ ← AKeyGen(·,msk,pms)CP (C∗, pms, st1)
If some of the following statements is not true, output ⊥:
(i) ACP has not made any secret key query S such that S ∩ P ∈ Γ ;
(ii) the number of secret key queries is at most L (the bound given in pms);
(iii) m(0) 6= m(1)
Otherwise, output 1 if b′ = b, and 0 if b′ 6= b.
The advantage of ACP in breaking the bounded IND-CPA property of the
CP-ABE scheme is defined as
Advind-cpaACP (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[Expind-cpaACP (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 8 A ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme is in-
distinguishable under bounded adaptive chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA
secure) if, for any adversary ACP that runs in polynomial time, the advantage
Advind-cpaACP (λ) is negligible in the security parameter λ.
5.3 KP-ABE: Syntactic Definition
A bounded key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) scheme, for mono-
tone policies, consists of four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms:
– Setup(1λ). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and
outputs some public parameters pms and a master secret key msk. The pub-
lic parameters contain the possible universe of attributes P˜ = {at1, . . . , atn}
and a bound L for the maximum number of users.
– KeyGen(P, Γ,msk, pms). The key generation algorithm takes as input the
master secret key msk, the public parameters pms, a set of attributes P ⊂ P˜
and a monotone policy Γ ⊂ 2P . The output is a private key skP,Γ .
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– Encrypt(m,S, pms). The encryption algorithm takes as input a message m,
a set of attributes S ⊂ P˜ and the public parameters pms, and outputs a
ciphertext C.
– Decryption(C, S, skP,Γ , pms). The decryption algorithm takes as input a
ciphertext C, the associated set of attributes S, a secret key skP,Γ and the
public parameters pms, and outputs a message m˜.
The correctness property requires that the decryption algorithm, when run
on a ciphertext C honestly computed for plaintext m and subset of attributes
S ⊂ P˜, using secret key skP,Γ , must output m if and only if S ∩ P ∈ Γ .
5.4 KP-ABE: Security Definition
Any polinomial-time adversary must have negligible success probability in dis-
tinguishing an encryption of m(0) from an encryption of m(1), for the same set
of attributes S ⊂ P˜, where m(0) 6= m(1) and S are chosen by the adversary.
This must hold even if the adversary has adaptive access to an oracle that
answers valid secret keys for pairs (P, Γ ) of his choice, provided S ∩ P /∈ Γ
holds, for all such queries. This IND-CPA property for KP-ABE schemes is
formally defined via the following experiment Expind-cpaAKP (λ),involving an ad-
versary AKP .
Expind-cpaAKP (λ)
Choose b R← {0, 1} at random
(pms,msk)← Setup(1λ)
(m(0),m(1), S, st1)← AKeyGen(·,msk,pms)KP (pms)
C∗ ← Encrypt(m(b), S, pms)
b′ ← AKeyGen(·,msk,pms)KP (C∗, pms, st1)
If some of the following statements is not true, output ⊥:
(i) AKP has not made any secret key query (P, Γ ) such that S ∩ P ∈ Γ ;
(ii) the number of secret key queries is at most L (the bound given in pms);
(iii) m(0) 6= m(1)
Otherwise, output 1 if b′ = b, and 0 if b′ 6= b.
The advantage of AKP in breaking the bounded IND-CPA property of the
KP-ABE scheme is defined as
Advind-cpaAKP (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[Expind-cpaAKP (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
Definition 9 A key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme is indistinguish-
able under bounded adaptive chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA secure) if, for
any adversary AKP that runs in polynomial time, the advantage Advind-cpaAKP (λ)
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
26 Javier Herranz
6 The New CP-ABE Scheme (for Threshold Policies)
For simplicity, we consider the case of threshold decryption policies. Therefore,
a pair (P, Γ ) will be represented as (P, t), where 1 ≤ t ≤ |P|. Later, we
will explain how the scheme can be modified to support other (more general)
policies.
Setup(1λ). The setup algorithm starts by running (q,G, g)← DLog.Inst(1λ),
which outputs a cyclic group G = 〈g〉 of prime order q, such that q is λ bits
long. The global set of attributes P˜ = {at1, . . . , atN} has to be chosen. A
bound L for the maximum number of users in the system has to be given.
Finally, the value M = L+ 2N is defined.
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and all j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, choose xi,j R← Z∗q indepen-
dently and at random. Compute Yi,j = g
xi,j .
The public parameters of the system are pms = (q,G, g, P˜, L,N,M, {Yi,j}1≤i≤N,1≤j≤M ),
whereas the master secret key is msk = {xi,j}1≤i≤N,1≤j≤M .
KeyGen(S,msk, pms). The key generation algorithm takes as input a subset
of attributes S ⊂ P˜, the master secret key msk and the public parameters pms.
The master entity chooses a vector a = (a1, . . . , aM )
R← (Zq)M , randomly,
from the set of vectors satisfying a · (xi,1, . . . , xi,M ) = 1, for all ati ∈ S.
The secret key, skS = a, contains M elements from Zq.
The correctness of the secret key can be verified by checking that
M∏
j=1
Y
aj
i,j =
g holds, for all ati ∈ S.
Encrypt(m,P, t, pms). The encryption algorithm takes as input a message
m ∈ G, a set of attributes P ⊂ P˜, a threshold t and the public parameters
pms. Without loss of generality and to simplify notation, let us assume P =
{at1, . . . , atn}. The algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. Choose at random r R← Z∗q , and compute the value C0 = m · gr.
2. For j = 1, . . . ,M , use Shamir’s (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme to
share 0 among the attributes in P. That is, choose a random polynomial
fj(x) ∈ Zq[X] with degree t− 1 such that fj(0) = 0.
3. For each i = 1, . . . , n and each j = 1, . . . ,M , compute the value Ci,j =
Y ri,j · gfj(i).
The final ciphertext, C = ( C0 , {Ci,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤M ), contains nM + 1
elements from G.
Decrypt(C,P, t, skS , pms). The decryption algorithm takes as input a ci-
phertext C, a set of attributes P ⊂ P˜, a threshold t, a secret key skS = a
and the public parameters pms. The algorithm selects a minimally authorized
set S′, this is, a subset of S ∩ P of cardinality exactly t. Let {λS′i }ati∈S′ de-
note the corresponding Lagrange interpolation coefficients, such that f(0) =∑
ati∈S′
λS
′
i f(i), for all polynomial f(x) with degree at most t− 1. In particular,
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note that for the constant polynomial f(x) = 1, we get 1 =
∑
ati∈S′
λS
′
i . The
decryption algorithm simply computes and outputs the value
C0 ·
∏
ati∈S′
 M∏
j=1
C
aj
i,j
−λ
S′
i
6.1 Remarks and Correctness
If some vector a given to some user as part of his secret key was a linear
combination of other vectors a(`) given to other users, then the security of the
scheme could be compromised, since the system could not resist a coalition
attack. The probability of such a linear dependence is negligible in the security
parameter λ. However, in a real implementation of this scheme, it could be
desirable to explicitly check that such dependence relations do not occur.
In order to (slightly) improve efficiency, we can partially apply the idea
in Section 4.6: vectors a can be defined as a = (a(1),a(2)), where a(1) =
(1, a, a2, . . . , aL−1) ∈ (Zq)L for some value a ∈ Z∗q , and a(2) ∈ (Zq)2N . The
first part ensures linear independence, and the second part contains enough
degrees of freedom so that a satisfies the desired properties. In this way, since
a(1) can be represented by element a, the length of skP,t becomes 1 + 2N ,
independent of the bound L on the number of users.
The correctness of the scheme can be easily verified:
C0 ·
∏
ati∈S′
 M∏
j=1
C
aj
i,j
−λ
S′
i
= m·gr·
∏
ati∈S′
 M∏
j=1
(
Y
aj
i,j
)r ·
 M∏
j=1
gaj ·fj(i)
−λ
S′
i
=
m·gr·
( ∏
ati∈S′
(gr)
−λS′i
)
·
M∏
j=1
( ∏
ati∈S′
gλ
S′
i fj(i)
)−aj
= m·gr·g−r·
M∏
j=1
(
gfj(0)
)−aj
= m·
M∏
j=1
1−aj = m.
6.2 Security of the CP-ABE Scheme
Theorem 3 Assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in
G, then the proposed ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption scheme is
IND-CPA secure.
Proof Let ACP be an adversary against the IND-CPA security of the ABE
scheme. Without loss of generality, let us assume that:
1. P = {at1, . . . , atn} and t ∈ {1, . . . , n} in the challenge threshold policy
(P, t).
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2. ACP makes L secret key queries, for subsets of attributes S1, . . . , SL such
that |S` ∩ P| = t − 1, for all queries, ` = 1, . . . , L. Let skS` = a(`) denote
the obtained secret key, for ` = 1, . . . , L.
For each attribute ati ∈ P, let us define Zi = {a(`) s.t. ati ∈ S`} and
zi = |Zi|. We have 0 ≤ zi ≤ L and
∑
1≤i≤n
zi = (t− 1)L.
Assuming the existence of a successful adversary ACP with non-negligible
advantage Advind-cpaACP (λ), let us construct an adversary ADDH against the DDH
problem. Let (g, gx, gy, T ) be the given instance of the DDH problem. ADDH
generates public parameters pms for the CP-ABE scheme as follows. ADDH
chooses the global set of attributes P˜ = {at1, . . . , atN} and the bound L for the
maximum number of users in the system (and so, for the number of extraction
queries that A can make). The value M = L + 2N is defined. To define the
values {Yi,j}1≤i≤N,1≤j≤M , ADDH chooses 2N vectors µi = (µi,1, . . . , µi,M ) R←
(Zq)M , θi = (θi,1, . . . , θi,M ) R← (Zq)M , for i = 1, . . . , N , all of them indepen-
dent and random. ADDH defines Yi,j = gµi,j · (gy)θi,j , for each i = 1, . . . , N
and each j = 1, . . . ,M .
The public parameters of the system that ADDH gives to ACP are pms =
(q,G, g, P˜, L,N,M, {Yi,j}1≤i≤N,1≤j≤M ). During the experiment,ACP will make
up to L extraction queries, to obtain secret keys for subsets S of his choice,
where S ⊂ P˜. We have to give correct answers to all such queries. To answer
the `-th extraction query, where ` ∈ {1, . . . , L}, corresponding to some subset
of attributes S`, ADDH chooses a(`) = (a(`)1 , . . . , a(`)M ) R← (Zq)M , randomly
from the set of vectors that satisfy a(`) · µi = 1 mod q and a(`) · θi = 0 mod q,
for all i such that ati ∈ S`, and such that a(`) is linearly independent with
a(1), . . . ,a(`−1).
Since N is an upper bound for the size of S, and the vector space (Zq)M
has dimension M = L + 2N , it is always possible to find such L linearly
independent vectors, and the distribution of the secret keys obtained by ACP
is the same (up to a negligible factor) as in a real execution of the ABE scheme.
At some pointACP outputs a challenge query for two messagesm(0),m(1) ∈
G with m(0) 6= m(1) and a threshold decryption policy (P, t), where P =
{at1, . . . , atn} for simplicity. ADDH chooses at random a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and
computes C0 = m
(b) · (gx). Implicitly, this defines r = x in the challenge
ciphertext.
For each j = 1, . . . ,M , ADDH chooses independently and at random a
polynomial fj(x) = f
(1)
j x+ . . .+f
(t−1)
j x
t−1 with degree t−1 such that fj(0) =
0.
For each i = 1, . . . , n and each j = 1, . . . ,M , ADDH computes the value
Ci,j = (g
x)
µi,j · T θi,j · gfj(i)
The challenge ciphertext thatADDH gives toACP is C∗ = ( C0 , {Ci,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤M ).
When ACP outputs a bit b′, the adversary ADDH acts as follows: if b′ = b,
then ADDH concludes that T = gxy and outputs 0; otherwise, if b′ 6= b, then
ADDH concludes that T is random, and outputs 1.
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On the one hand, if the given instance of the DDH problem satisfies T =
gxy, then it is easy to check that C∗ is a valid ciphertext for message m(b).
In this case, the output bit b′ of ACP will satisfy b′ = b with probability
1
2 + Adv
ind-cpa
ACP (λ).
On the other hand, let us discuss what happens when, in the instance of
the DDH problem, T is random and independent of x, y. The goal is to show
that, in this case, the distribution of the the values that ACP sees during the
attack is independent of the bit b, even if ACP has unlimited computational
power (in particular, we assume that ACP can compute discrete logarithms,
now). If we succeed in proving this, then the output bit b′ of ACP will satisfy
b′ = b with probability 12 in this case.
Let us write T = gxy+e, where e 6= 0 mod q with overwhelming probability,
in the considered case. The information available to ACP during the attack
includes:
– the discrete logarithms of values Yi,j in pms, for i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,M .
This means values δi,j := µi,j + yθi,j , for i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,M ;
– the secret keys skS` = a
(`), satisfying a(`) · µi = 1 and a(`) · θi = 0, for all
ati ∈ S(`);
– the discrete logarithms of the elements in the challenge ciphertext C∗. This
means α(b)+x, being m(b) = gα
(b)
for C0, and finally the discrete logarithm
ci,j of each Ci,j , which is
ci,j = x(µi,j + yθi,j) + eθi,j +
t−1∑
k=1
f
(k)
j i
k
Note that ci,j can be rewriten as xδi,j + eθi,j +
t−1∑
k=1
f
(k)
j i
k.
Let us consider the following vector X of independent and uniform random
variables in Zq,
X =
(
x , {f (k)j }1≤j≤M,1≤k≤t−1 , {θi,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤M , {µi,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤M
)
and a vector Y of variables reflectingA’s view (values ci,j , δi,j and the relations
between vectors a(`) and vectors µi and θi, for all attribute ati ∈ S(`) and
` = 1, . . . , L):
Y =
(
x+ α(b), {ci,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤M , {δi,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤M , 0, . . . , 0, 1, . . . , 1
)
The two vectors of variables are related by an affine transformation Y =
A ·X + b, where b = (α(b), 0, . . . , 0) is the constant vector, and matrix A has
1 + 2nM + 2L(t− 1) rows and 1 + (t− 1)(M + 1) + 2nM columns. Since the
variables in X are uniformly random and independent, if we are able to see
that the first row of the matrix A is linearly independent from the rest of rows,
then we will conclude that the first random variable in Y, which corresponds to
element C0 in the challenge ciphertext, is independent from the other values
in A’s view. In such a case, we will conclude that the distribution of the
ciphertext is independent of the bit b, as desired.
30 Javier Herranz
Lemma 1 The first row of matrix A is not contained in the vector space
spanned by the rest of rows of A.
Proof To ease the global reading of the paper, in particular of this proof of
Theorem 3, the proof of this lemma is moved to Appendix A. uunionsq
Final analysis. The probability that ADDH wins the DDH game is
Pr[ExpddhADDH (λ) = 1] = Pr[ADDH wins] =
= Pr[T = gxy]·Pr[ADDH wins|T = gxy]+Pr[T random]·Pr[ADDH wins|T random] =
=
1
2
·
(
1
2
+ Advind-cpaACP (λ)
)
+
1
2
· 1
2
=
1
2
+
1
2
· Advind-cpaACP (λ)
Therefore, we have constructed an algorithm ADDH that solves the DDH
problem with non-negligible advantage
AdvddhADDH (λ) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ExpddhADDH (λ) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ = 12 · Advind-cpaACP (λ).
uunionsq
7 The New KP-ABE Scheme (for Threshold Policies)
Again, we consider for the moment the case of threshold policies. Therefore, a
pair (P, Γ ) will be represented as (P, t), where 1 ≤ t ≤ |P|. The new KP-ABE
scheme is very similar to the CP-ABE scheme in the previous section.
Setup(1λ). The setup algorithm starts by running (q,G, g)← DLog.Inst(1λ),
which outputs a cyclic group G = 〈g〉 of prime order q, such that q is λ bits
long. The global set of attributes P˜ = {at1, . . . , atN} has to be chosen. A
bound L for the maximum number of users in the system has to be given.
Finally, the value M = L+ 2N is defined.
For all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and all j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, choose xi,j R← Z∗q indepen-
dently and at random. Compute Yi,j = g
xi,j .
The public parameters of the system are pms = (q,G, g, P˜, L,N,M, {Yi,j}1≤i≤N,1≤j≤M ),
whereas the master secret key is msk = {xi,j}1≤i≤N,1≤j≤M .
KeyGen(P, t,msk, pms). The key generation algorithm takes as input a sub-
set of n attributes P ⊂ P˜ and a threshold t such that 1 ≤ t ≤ n ≤ N , the
master secret key msk and the public parameters pms.
The master entity uses Shamir’s (t, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme to
share 1 among the attributes in P. That is, he chooses a random polynomial
f(x) ∈ Zq[X] with degree t − 1 such that f(0) = 1, and he defines si = f(i),
for all ati ∈ P.
After that, the master entity chooses a vector a = (a1, . . . , aM )
R← (Zq)M ,
randomly, from the set of vectors satisfying a · (xi,1, . . . , xi,M ) = si, for all
ati ∈ P.
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The secret key, skP,t = a, contains M elements from Zq.
The correctness of the secret key can be verified by checking that, for any
subset S ⊂ P with |S| = t, it holds ∏
ati∈S
(
M∏
j=1
Y
aj
i,j
)λSi
= g, where {λSi }ati∈S
denote the corresponding Lagrange interpolation coefficients.
Encrypt(m,S, pms). The encryption algorithm takes as input a messagem ∈
G, a set of attributes S ⊂ P˜ and the public parameters pms. Let us assume, for
simplicity, that S = {at1, . . . , atn}, with |S| = n ≤ N . The algorithm proceeds
as follows.
1. Choose at random r R← Z∗q , and compute the value C0 = m · gr.
2. For each i = 1, . . . , n and each j = 1, . . . ,M , compute the value Ci,j = Y
r
i,j .
The final ciphertext, C = ( C0 , {Ci,j}1≤i≤n,1≤j≤M ), contains nM + 1
elements from G.
Decrypt(C, S, skS , pms). The decryption algorithm takes as input a cipher-
text C, the associated set of attributes S ⊂ P˜, a secret key skP,t = a and
the public parameters pms. The algorithm selects a minimally authorized set
S′ ⊂ S ∩ P of cardinality exactly t. Let {λS′i }ati∈S′ denote the correspond-
ing Lagrange interpolation coefficients, such that f(0) =
∑
ati∈S′
λS
′
i f(i), for all
polynomial f(x) with degree at most t−1. In particular, note that for the con-
stant polynomial f(x) = 1, we get 1 =
∑
ati∈S′
λS
′
i . The decryption algorithm
simply computes and outputs the value
C0 ·
∏
ati∈S′
 M∏
j=1
C
aj
i,j
−λ
S′
i
7.1 Remarks and Correctness
The same remarks as in the case of the CP-ABE scheme can be made now,
regarding the linear independence of the vectors a in different secret keys,
and the efficiency improvement (regarding the size of the secret keys) by con-
sidering a = (1, a, a2, . . . , aL−1,a(2)) for some value a ∈ Z∗q and some vector
a(2) ∈ (Zq)2N .
The correctness of the KP-ABE scheme can be easily verified:
C0 ·
∏
ati∈S′
 M∏
j=1
C
aj
i,j
−λ
S′
i
= m · gr ·
∏
ati∈S′
 M∏
j=1
(
Y
aj
i,j
)r−λ
S′
i
=
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m · gr ·
∏
ati∈S′
(gsi)
−r·λS′i = m · gr ·
(
g
∑
ati∈S′
λS
′
i f(i)
)−r
= m · gr · (g1)−r = m.
7.2 Security of the KP-ABE Scheme
Theorem 4 Assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in
G, then the proposed key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme is IND-CPA
secure.
Proof (Sketch.) The proof follows the same ideas as the proof of Theorem 3 for
the security of the CP-ABE scheme. We transform a hypothetical successful
adversary AKP against the KP-ABE scheme into an adversary ADDH against
the DDH problem. If (g, gx, gy, T ) is the given instance of the DDH problem,
ADDH generates the public parameters pms for the KP-ABE scheme exactly
as in the proof of Theorem 3. In particular, ADDH defines Yi,j = gµi,j ·(gy)θi,j ,
for each i = 1, . . . , N and each j = 1, . . . ,M .
When AKP makes its `-th extraction query, to obtain a secret key for a
pair (P`, t`) of its choice, ADDH chooses at random a degree t`−1 polynomial
f (`)(x) such that f (`)(0) = 1, and then chooses a vector a(`) = (a
(`)
1 , . . . , a
(`)
M )
R←
(Zq)M , randomly from the set of vectors that satisfy a(`) · µi = f (`)(i) mod q
and a(`) ·θi = 0 mod q, for all i such that ati ∈ P`, and such that a(`) is linearly
independent with a(1), . . . ,a(`−1).
Since N is an upper bound for the size of S, and the vector space (Zq)M
has dimension M = L + 2N , it is always possible to find such L linearly
independent vectors, whose distribution is essentially the same as in a real
execution of the KP-ABE scheme.
When AKP outputs a challenge query for two messages m(0),m(1) ∈ G
with m(0) 6= m(1) and a subset of attributes S ⊂ P˜, ADDH chooses at random
a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and computes C0 = m(b) · (gx). For each i = 1, . . . , n and each
j = 1, . . . ,M , ADDH computes the value Ci,j = (gx)µi,j · T θi,j .
When AKP outputs a bit b′, the adversary ADDH acts as follows: if b′ = b,
then ADDH concludes that T = gxy and outputs 0; otherwise, if b′ 6= b, then
ADDH concludes that T is random, and outputs 1.
If the given instance of the DDH problem satisfies T = gxy, then C∗ is a
valid ciphertext for message m(b). In this case, the output bit b′ of AKP will
satisfy b′ = b with probability 12 + Adv
ind-cpa
AKP (λ).
On the other hand, when T is random and independent of x, y in the
given instance of the DDH problem, then we can again write T = gxy+e for
a random value e, different from zero with overwhelming probability. In this
case, we can show (by using similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem
3) that the distribution of the the values that AKP sees during the attack
is independent of the bit b. Note that C0 = m
(b) · (gx), and the dependence
on x of all the other elements Ci,j in the challenge ciphertext is cancelled by
the randomness θi,j in values Yi,j of the public parameters. Some degrees of
freedom/independence on these values θi,j are “lost” in front of AKP when
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he makes the L extraction queries for pairs (P`, t`); note however that these
queries must satisfy |P`∩S| ≤ t`−1, by definition, and that there are precisely
t` − 1 perfectly hidden degrees of freedom in the choice of the polynomial
f (`)(x). Therefore, and informally speaking (this can be formally proved, as
we have done in the proof of Theorem 3) the t`−1 degrees of freedom on values
{θi,j}ati∈S,1≤j≤M that are “lost” by the conditions θi · a(`) = 0 for all ati ∈
P` ∩S are compensated by the t`− 1 perfectly hidden values {f (`)(i)}ati∈P`∩S
that univocally determine, along with f (`)(0) = 1, the polynomial f (`)(x).
Therefore, the conclusion is the same as in the proof of Theorem 3: the
existence of an algorithm ADDH that solves the DDH problem with non-
negligible advantage
AdvddhADDH (λ) =
1
2
· Advind-cpaAKP (λ).
uunionsq
8 Extensions, (In)Efficiency Considerations and Applications
8.1 More General Policies
In the description of our schemes, we have considered for simplicity the par-
ticular case where policies are of the threshold family. However, the schemes
can be extended to admit more general (monotone) policies Γ ⊂ P. In the
attribute-based signature scheme, in particular in the zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge protocol, the idea is to consider a secret sharing scheme (for in-
stance, a monotone span program [23]) that realizes the dual access structure
Γ ∗ = {S ⊂ P | P − S /∈ Γ}; the value c will be the secret, and the val-
ues {cj}atj∈P will be the shares, that will be computed with the secret sharing
scheme for the access structure Γ ∗. In the threshold case, the dual access struc-
ture is Γ ∗ = {S ⊂ P | |S| ≥ n− t+ 1}, and the secret is shared with Shamir’s
method, with a polynomial of degree n− t. This kind of zero-knowledge proofs
were introduced for the first time in [13]. Apart from replacing polynomials
with monotone span programs, the rest of the protocol and the security anal-
ysis work exactly in the same way as we detail here for the threshold case.
In the attribute-based encryption schemes, the idea is simply to replace
polynomials with monotone span programs that realize the corresponding pol-
icy Γ . Another difference is that some (algebraic) parts of the security proofs
become (even) more tedious.
8.2 (In)Efficiency
The fact that a bound L on the total number of users must be fixed from the
beginning is a drawback, but in some real-life applications this may not be a
serious limitation. However, the fact that the efficiency of the new schemes (size
of the public parameters, secret keys, signatures, ciphertexts, running times...)
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depend on L is a more serious drawback, which may limit the applicability of
our schemes to very restricted scenarios, like small companies or institutions.
Elements in our signatures or ciphertexts may belong to a standard group
G where the discrete logarithm problem is hard (points of an elliptic curve)
and can thus be securely represented by λ = 160 bits, in contrast to the the
1024 or 2048 bits needed to represent elements in RSA-based [22] or pairing-
based [25] solutions. But this “advantage” quickly disappears since the number
of elements in our (non-optimized) signatures or ciphertexts is n(6+L+N) or
n(L+2N), whereN is the total number of attributes in the system. In the other
schemes in the literature, for general monotone policies and with adaptive
security, this number is typically 6n or 9n. Focusing on the encryption case,
this means that our schemes can be competitive only for values L+ 2N ≤ 70,
for instance in applications with N = 20 attributes and L = 30 users.
Since we do not want to finish the work with a negative opinion of the new
schemes, we show in the next section that the bounded-security property of
our schemes (in particular, the KP-ABE scheme) is enough to find a positive
application.
8.3 Application to Verifiable Computation
Parno, Raykova and Vaikuntanathan give in [30] a general construction from
a KP-ABE scheme to a protocol for the verifiable delegation of computation
of boolean functions f : {0, 1}N → {0, 1}. Note that a boolean function is
equivalent to an access structure on a set of N elements (or attributes, in the
context of this paper).
The basic idea is that the client runs the setup phase of the KP-ABE
scheme twice, (pms0,msk0)← KP-ABE.Setup(1λ) and (pms1,msk1)← KP-ABE.Setup(1λ).
Later, to delegate the computation of some boolean function f admitted by
the KP-ABE scheme, the client runs skf ← KP-ABE.KeyGen(f,msk0, pms0)
and skf¯ ← KP-ABE.KeyGen(f¯ ,msk1, pms1), where f¯ is the negation of f :
f¯(x) = 1 − f(x), for all x ∈ {0, 1}N . The values (pms0, pms1, skf , skf¯ ) are
given to the server. The client chooses a secure one-way function H.
Each time the client wants the server to compute f(x) on some boolean vec-
tor x ∈ {0, 1}N , he chooses two random plaintexts m(0),m(1) and computes ci-
phertexts C(0) ← KP-ABE.Encrypt(m(0),x, pms0) and C(1) ← KP-ABE.Encrypt(m(1),x, pms1),
along with the hash values s0 = H(m
(0)) and s1 = H(m
(1)). The clieint sends
x and the ciphertexts C(0), C(1) to the server, and stores or publishes the pair
(s0, s1).
If f(x) = 1, the server computesm(0) ← KP-ABE.Decrypt(C(0),x, skf , pms0)
and sends (m(0),⊥) to the client. If f(x) = 0 (and so f¯(x) = 1), the server
computes m(1) ← KP-ABE.Decrypt(C(1),x, skf¯ , pms1) and sends (⊥,m(1)) to
the client.
Depending on the obtained answer and its relation to the stored hashed
values (s0, s1), the client (or anybody) concludes what is the correct value
of f(x). Furthermore, thanks to the two parallel executions of the KP-ABE
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process, the server cannot cheat the client without being detected; the worse
he can do is to abort the process. That is, the computation performed by the
server is (publicly) verifiable.
Parno et al. prove in [30] that the resulting protocol for (publicly) verifiable
computation of boolean functions is secure, provided the underlying KP-ABE
scheme is one-key secure, which means that it must be secure in front of ad-
versaries that can make at most one secret key extraction query. Translated to
the framework of this paper, we can use our bounded KP-ABE scheme with
L = 1 (and thus, M = 1+2N) to instantiate the Parno et al. construction. As
a result, we obtain a protocol for the verifiable computation (VC) of monotone
boolean functions, in the standard Discrete Logarithm scenario, with security
based on the DDH Assumption. A (small) drawback of the resulting VC proto-
col with respect to other instantiations of the construction, for instance using
pairing-based KP-ABE schemes, is that the cost for the client is quadratic on
N , rather than linear, because the encryption running time in our KP-ABE
scheme depends on NM = 2N2 +N .
8.3.1 A Comment on the Monotonicity of f (and f¯).
As we have noted in the previous paragraph, the resulting VC protocol would
be valid for monotone boolean functions, because the underlying KP-ABE
scheme only admits monotone functions (or access policies). This is not a
serious problem in practice; as noted in [30], a non-monotone boolean function
f1 can always be transformed into an equivalent monotone one, by doubling the
number N of variables (including the negation of each variable). Note that this
observation would be important even in the case where the VC protocol was
run to evaluate a monotone (increasing) function f , because the underlying
KP-ABE scheme must admit the function f¯ , which is monotone decreasing. If
the KP-ABE scheme admits only monotone increasing functions, then f must
not be modified, but we should find a monotone increasing function equivalent
to f¯ .
This means that, with the transformation proposed in [30] applied to a
KP-ABE scheme which admits only monotone increasing functions, one al-
ways needs to double the number of variables, from N to 2N , even if the
client only wants to evaluate monotone increasing functions. This observation
is important since most of the KP-ABE schemes proposed in the literature (in-
cluding the new one, in this work) only admit monotone increasing functions;
a notable exception can be found in [29].
However, it turns out that the transformation in [30] can be modified
in the following way. First of all, in the delegation phase, replace skf¯ ←
KP-ABE.KeyGen(f¯ ,msk1, pms1) with skf∗ ← KP-ABE.KeyGen(f∗,msk1, pms1),
where f∗ is the dual function of f : f∗(x) = 1 − f(x¯), for all x ∈ {0, 1}N .
Later, in the request phase, replace C(1) ← Encrypt(m(1),x, pms1) with C(1) ←
Encrypt(m(1), x¯, pms1). With these modifications, the server can either obtain
m(0), if f(x) = 1, or obtain m(1), if f∗(x¯) = 1, which is equivalent to f(x) = 0.
So the functionality of the construction is preserved, but now we have that
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the monotonicity of f∗ is the same as that of f (if any). Therefore, if a client
is interested in the verifiable computation of a monotone increasing function
f , and the underlying KP-ABE scheme admits only this kind of functions, we
can run this modified version of the Parno et al. construction without doubling
the number of variables.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
The first row of A is (1, 0, . . . , 0). The following nM rows, corresponding to values ci,j in
vector Y, reflect the relation
ci,j = xδi,j + eθi,j +
t−1∑
k=1
f
(k)
j i
k
The following nM rows, corresponding to values δi,j in A’s view, reflect the relation
δi,j = yθi,j + µi,j .
The following L(t− 1) rows reflect the relations
a(`) · θi = 0, ∀ati ∈ S(`), ∀` = 1, . . . , L.
Finally, the last L(t− 1) rows of matrix A reflect the relations
a(`) · µi = 1, ∀ati ∈ S(`), ∀` = 1, . . . , L.
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The general form of matrix A is shown in Figure 1.

1 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
δ1,1 1 12 . . . 1t−1
δ1,2 1 12 . . . 1t−1 e · IdM
...
. . .
δ1,M 1 1
2 . . . 1t−1
.
..
. . .
. . .
δn,1 n n2 . . . nt−1
δn,2 n n2 . . . nt−1 e · IdM
...
. . .
δn,M n n
2 . . . nt−1
y · IdM IdM
. . .
. . .
y · IdM IdM
a(`1) ∈ Z1
...
. . .
a(`n) ∈ Zn
...
a(`1) ∈ Z1
...
. . .
a(`n) ∈ Zn
...

Fig. 1: The initial matrix, A
The last n blocks of rows in A can be substracted with linear combinations of the rows
in the blocks with y · IdM . . . IdM , and we get the transformed but equivalent matrix A(2),
depicted in Figure 2.
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
1 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
δ1,1 1 12 . . . 1t−1
δ1,2 1 12 . . . 1t−1 e · IdM
...
. . .
δ1,M 1 1
2 . . . 1t−1
...
. . .
. . .
δn,1 n n2 . . . nt−1
δn,2 n n2 . . . nt−1 e · IdM
...
. . .
δn,M n n
2 . . . nt−1
y · IdM IdM
. . .
. . .
y · IdM IdM
a(`1) ∈ Z1
...
. . .
a(`n) ∈ Zn
...
−y · a(`1) ∈ Z1
...
. . .
−y · a(`n) ∈ Zn
..
.

Fig. 2: Matrix A(2)
Since our goal is to prove that the first row of the matrix is not spanned by the rest
of rows of the matrix, we can now remove the rows and columns “touched” by the blocks
IdM on the right part of the matrix, because the coefficients of these rows in a hypothetical
linear combination of all the rows that would equal the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) would be equal
to 0. Similarly, we can remove the last n blocks of rows, because these rows are multiples of
the rows in the previous n blocks (by multiplying them with −y).
All in all, we get a reduced matrix A(3), in Figure 3, where we still want to show that
the first row is not spanned by the rest of rows.
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1 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
δ1,1 1 12 . . . 1t−1
δ1,2 1 12 . . . 1t−1 e · IdM
...
. . .
δ1,M 1 1
2 . . . 1t−1
...
. . .
. . .
δn,1 n n2 . . . nt−1
δn,2 n n2 . . . nt−1 e · IdM
...
. . .
δn,M n n
2 . . . nt−1
a(`1) ∈ Z1
...
. . .
a(`n) ∈ Zn
...

Fig. 3: Matrix A(3)
In the M central blocks of columns of A(3), with Vandermonde vectors, we can re-
order the rows in order to get (1, . . . , 1t−1), and below (2, . . . , 2t−1), and so on, until (t −
1, . . . , (t−1)t−1), and then the rest of vectors until (n . . . , nt−1) and the same effect repeated
M times, in diagonal descending cascade. We can transform the rows corresponding to each
index s ∈ {t, t+ 1, . . . , n} by substracting to them linear combinations (with the Lagrange
interpolation coefficients) of the rows corresponding to indices in {1, . . . , t − 1}, in order
to get 0’s in all these n − t + 1 rows of each of those M blocks. We denote as λ(s)i the
corresponding Lagrange coefficients, such that (s, . . . , st−1) =
∑
1≤i≤t−1
λ
(s)
i (i, . . . , i
t−1).
What we get after applying these transformations is matrix A(4), in Figure 4. Values
marked with ∗ in A(4) and the following matrices are not relevant.
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1 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . 0
δ1,1 1 . . . 1t−1
δ2,1 2 . . . 2t−1 ∗
...
... ∗
δt−1,1 (t− 1) . . . (t− 1)t−1
...
. . .
. . .
δ1,M 1 . . . 1
t−1
δ2,M 2 . . . 2
t−1 ∗
... ∗
δt−1,M (t− 1) . . . (t− 1)t−1
∗
... −λ(t)1 · e · IdM . . . −λ(t)t−1 · e · IdM e · IdM
∗
... . . . . . . . . .
. . .
∗
... −λ(n)1 · e · IdM . . . −λ(n)t−1 · e · IdM e · IdM
∗
a(`1) ∈ Z1
...
. . .
a(`t−1) ∈ Zt−1
...
a(`t) ∈ Zt
...
. . .
a(`n) ∈ Zn
...

Fig. 4: Matrix A(4)
Now the non-zero rows of the central M blocks of columns are clearly linearly indepen-
dent (seen as vectors in (Zq)M(t−1)) so, again, a hypothetical linear combination of all the
rows in A(4) (excepting the first one) that would equal the vector (1, 0, . . . , 0) would have 0
as the coefficient of these rows. We can thus remove the corresponding rows and columns,
and we get matrix A(5), in Figure 5, where we still want to pove that the first row is not
spanned by the rest of rows.
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1 0 . . . 0
∗
... −λ(t)1 · e · IdM . . . −λ(t)t−1 · e · IdM e · IdM
∗
... . . .
. . . . . .
. . .
∗
... −λ(n)1 · e · IdM . . . −λ(n)t−1 · e · IdM e · IdM
∗
a(`1) ∈ Z1
...
. . .
a(`t−1) ∈ Zt−1
...
a(`t) ∈ Zt
...
. . .
a(`n) ∈ Zn
...

Fig. 5: Matrix A(5)
In the next transformation, we are going to transform the last zt + . . .+ zn rows of A(5)
into 0, by substracting to them some linear combinations of the rows with e·IdM on the right
part. As a result, we will be able to remove all the columns and rows “touched” by those
blocks e · IdM , because these rows cannot contribute in a hypothetical linear combination
of all the rows in the modified A(5) matrix (excepting the first one) that would equal the
vector (1, 0, . . . , 0). The result of these two steps is matrix A(6), depicted in Figure 6.
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1 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 . . . . . . 0
a(`1) ∈ Z1
...
a(`2) ∈ Z2
...
. . .
a(`t−1) ∈ Zt−1
...
∗ λ(t)1 · a(`t) ∈ Zt λ(t)2 · a(`t) ∈ Zt . . . λ(t)t−1 · a(`t) ∈ Zt
...
...
...
...
...
.
..
.
..
.
..
. . .
.
..
∗ λ(n)1 · a(`n) ∈ Zn λ(n)2 · a(`n) ∈ Zn . . . λ(n)t−1 · a(`n) ∈ Zn
...
...
...
...
...

Fig. 6: Matrix A(6)
Let us now look for possible linear combinations of the rows (all but the first one) of
matrix A(6) that could equal the first row, that is, vector (1, 0, . . . , 0). Let us denote the
coefficients of such a hypothetical linear combination as {ρ(`)i }1≤`≤L,ati∈S`∩P .
Looking at the right part, below the 0’s of the first row, and taking into account that
these vectors are all linearly independent, we have that the sum of the coefficients of all the
rows corresponding to a same vector a(`) must be 0. Let us focus on one such vector a(`),
corresponding to a secret key query for a subset of attributes S` such that |S` ∩P| = t− 1.
Let us define A` = S` ∩ {at1, . . . , att−1} and B` = S` ∩ {att, . . . , atn}, and let us denote
r = |A`| and w = |B`|, such that t − 1 = r + w. The involved coefficients {ρ(`)i }ati∈S`∩P
must satisfy the following conditions, for all i = 1, . . . , t − 1 (that is, for each of the t − 1
blocks of M columns below the 0’s of the first row):
(i) if ati ∈ A`, then ρ(`)i +
∑
ats∈B`
ρ
(`)
s · λ(s)i = 0,
(ii) if ati /∈ A`, then
∑
ats∈B`
ρ
(`)
s · λ(s)i = 0.
In other words, the vector of coefficients ({ρ(`)i }ati∈A` , {ρ
(`)
s }ats∈B` ) must be in the
kernel of the (t− 1)× (t− 1) matrix
D =

λ
(s1)
i1
. . . λ
(sw)
i1
Idr
.
..
.
..
λ
(s1)
ir
. . . λ
(sw)
ir
λ
(s1)
ir+1
. . . λ
(sw)
ir+1
...
...
λ
(s1)
it−1 . . . λ
(sw)
it−1

where A` = {ati1 , . . . , atir}, B` = {ats1 , . . . , atsw} and we use ir+1, . . . , it−1 to refer to the
indices in {1, . . . , t− 1} − A`. The bottom-right part of D is a non-singular w × w matrix,
because it is a square submatrix of the (t− 1)× (t− 1) matrix Λ of Lagrange interpolation
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coefficients that one would obtain by considering t − 1 interpolation points {1, . . . , t − 1}
and t− 1 external evaluation points {s1, . . . , sw, s˜w+1, . . . , s˜t−1}. Matrix Λ is non-singular
because it is the product of two non-singular matrices: the matrix which has the coefficients
of the t − 1 interpolation polynomials (a basis) as rows, and the matrix which has the
Vandermonde vectors of the evaluation points as columns.
Since we have the identity matrix Idr on the top-left part of D, we conclude that D is
non-singular, and therefore there is no vector in the kernel of D, other than the zero vector
0.
Summing up, for all the vectors a(`), ` = 1, . . . , L, we have that all the coefficients
{ρ(`)i }ati∈S`∩P must be equal to 0. This concludes the proof of the fact that the first row
of matrix A is not spanned by the rest of the rows of A.
